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Chief Justice John Roberts:
Institutionalist or Hubris-in-Chief?
Eric J. Segall*
Abstract
The conventional wisdom among Supreme Court scholars
and commentators is that Chief Justice John Roberts is an
institutionalist who cares deeply about both his personal legacy
and the Supreme Court’s prestige over time. This essay
challenges that belief. While the Chief certainly cares about how
the Court is perceived by the public, as do most of the justices,
what most defines Roberts is his hubris—not a concern for the
Court’s legitimacy or even his own place in history. Across the
vast landscape of constitutional law, Roberts has distorted
precedent and ignored text and history to further his own policy
preferences. A master of the long game and the catchy sound bite,
hubris, not institutionalism, most defines the Chief Justice of the
United States.
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INTRODUCTION
The prevailing wisdom inside and outside legal academia is
that Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., is first and foremost an
institutionalist who cares deeply about his personal legacy and
how his Court will be viewed when he retires.1 Supreme Court
commentators point to his two votes to uphold the Affordable
Care Act,2 as well as his decision to abide by the Court’s recent
precedent when he upheld an abortion law in June Medical v.
Gee,3 as the main support for the notion that the Chief
sometimes subsumes his personal preferences to the greater
good of Supreme Court legitimacy over time. This oft-told tale,
however, is mostly fiction. The defining feature of Chief Justice
Roberts’ jurisprudence is not his alleged institutionalism, but
his judicial hubris.
I use the term judicial hubris to signify judicial behavior
that flouts convention, is overly aggressive, and substantially
distorts prior law to reach policy outcomes sought by the judge.
As this essay documents, Justice Roberts, across the spectrum
of our most contested and controversial constitutional law
questions, has led the Court to coerce both state and federal
governments to abide by his personal preferences, whether or
not positive legal sources supported those decisions and at times
even when prior law quite clearly did not justify the Chief’s

1. See Oliver Roeder, Is Chief Justice Roberts a Secret Liberal?,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Nov. 27, 2017, 12:42 PM), https://perma.cc/4W5W-E3ST
(detailing how institutional realities might explain a few of Roberts’
defections); Robin J. Effron, Institutional Integrity and the Roberts Court: Will
the Judicial Get Political?, BROOK. L. SCH., https://perma.cc/226R-LYFB
(“Justice Roberts . . . might have genuine conservative priors. But he is also
deeply committed to protecting the institution of the Supreme Court itself and
insulating it from the charge that it has just become a third political branch of
the federal government.”).
2. See Nat’l Fed’n. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012)
(upholding the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act); King v.
Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (upholding IRS regulation that extended the
tax credits the Affordable Care Act authorized to federal exchanges as well as
those created by states).
3. See June Med. Servs., LLC v. Gee, 139 S. Ct 663 (2020) sub nom June
Med. Servs., LLC v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020) (holding that the Act in
question violates the Constitution).
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opinions and votes. He has dictated important social policies in
cases ranging from affirmative action to campaign finance
reform to voting rights to the relationship between church and
state.4 In all of these areas, as well as many more, the Chief has
used catchy sound bites and worn clichés as justifications for
ignoring and/or distorting what is supposed to be the content of
constitutional interpretation: text, history, and prior case law.
Part I demonstrates that the most important characteristic
of the Chief’s jurisprudence is hubris. Part II offers a tentative
explanation for why this aspect of his behavior has been largely
ignored by academics and pundits and why that silence is so
dangerous to the rule of law and the functioning of the Supreme
Court in our national politics.
I.

HUBRIS AS CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
A. Affirmative Action

Parents, teachers, students, and school board officials in
both Seattle and Louisville tried for years to come up with plans
to increase the racial diversity of their public schools which had
been stymied by neighborhood segregation and other forms of
institutional racism.5 Although their plans differed in some
ways, both cities required minimum levels of diversity in their
schools by adopting racial balancing requirements.6 These plans
did not affect large numbers of students, but to reach these goals
some students were not given their first-choice neighborhood
schools.7 These desegregation markers were the products of
4. See infra Part I.
5. See Devon McCurdy, Parents Involved In Community Schools v.
Seattle School District No. 1 (2007), BLACK PAST (Nov. 24, 2007),
https://perma.cc/TS46-KNGN (discussing the details of the decision).
6. See id. (explaining that the Seattle plan classified students as white
or non-white and sought to ensure that the racial balance of each high school
was more or less proportional to the district’s overall composition of 41 percent
white and 59 percent non-white students, while the Louisville plan used
similar tools to ensure that each school had a Black population of at least 15
percent and no more than 50 percent).
7. See Lee Hochberg, Supreme Court Revisits Race in Public Schools,
PBS NEWS HOUR (Dec. 4, 2006, 12:00 AM), https://perma.cc/6PW6-72YM
(discussing with Kathleen Brose how her daughter, Elizabeth, did not get her
first three choices of high school because of the racial breakdown of her
preferred schools).
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local decision-making at its best.8 No judge required these plans
and their adoptions were made in good faith by government
officials and parents to help lessen to some degree the impact on
our public schools of centuries of formalized and legal racial
discrimination.9
The Supreme Court decided to hear these cases after
Justices Alito and Roberts joined the Court in 2006 when
Justices Rehnquist and O’Connor died and retired
respectively.10 Justice Roberts wrote the plurality opinion on
behalf of himself and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito.11
Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion and the four liberal
Justices dissented.12 According to Kennedy, Roberts’ opinion
was overly simplistic and did not engage fully with the issues
and the facts.13 Those observations are understatements.
There is much to criticize in Roberts’ opinion even if one
believes that these plans to integrate the public schools of two
American cities violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The most
egregious and controversial part of Roberts’ opinion invalidating
these diversity measures came at the end of the opinion where
he wrote this [in]famous sound bite: “The way to stop
discrimination based on race is to stop discriminating based on

8. See Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District
No. 1, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (June 28, 2007), https://perma.cc/Y2AM-SQSM
(noting that the integration programs used in Seattle and Louisville were
voluntary).
9. See id. (discussing the hope for producing an educational environment
that reflects the “pluralistic society” in which children will live).
10. See Alberto R. Gonzales, In Search of Justice: An Examination of the
Appointments of John G. Roberts and Samuel A. Alito to the U.S. Supreme
Court and Their Impact on American Jurisprudence, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 647, 653 (2014) (noting the impact the appointment of Justice Roberts and
Justice Alito had on jurisprudence after the death of Chief Justice Rehnquist
and retirement of Justice O’Connor).
11. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551
U.S. 701, 701 (2007) (authoring the majority opinion, Roberts and the Court
held that the integration plan to desegregate schools was unconstitutional
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
12. See id. at 788, 799 (noting the concurring opinions of Justice Thomas
and Justice Kennedy, and the dissents filed by Justice Stevens and Justice
Breyer).
13. See id. at 788 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating his belief that public
schools may sometimes consider race to ensure equal educational opportunity).
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race.”14 Kennedy responded that that this trope is “not sufficient
to decide these cases.”15
As numerous academics have argued, the Fourteenth
Amendment’s original meaning does not support the
invalidation of affirmative action programs and, of course, the
text of the Amendment does not even mention race.16 As the
Court announced in one of its earliest decisions interpreting the
Amendment, the newly freed slaves:
[N]eeded the protection which a wise government extends to
those who are unable to protect themselves. They especially
needed protection against unfriendly action in the States
where they were resident. It was in view of these
considerations the Fourteenth Amendment was framed and
adopted. It was designed to assure to the colored race the
enjoyment of all the civil rights that under the law are
enjoyed by white persons, and to give to that race the
protection of the general government, in that enjoyment,
whenever it should be denied by the States.17

The limited racial balancing that the school districts in
Seattle and Louisville employed to make up for centuries of
racial oppression were designed to afford their children the
opportunity to go to school with students of other races for the
laudable purpose of alleviating at least a little of the
institutional racism that still haunts our country.18 There may
be policy arguments, such as those repeatedly made by Justice
Thomas in affirmative action cases,19 that using race in this
14. Id. at 748.
15. Id. at 788 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
16. See, e.g., Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative
History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753, 798 (1985) (“From
the closing days of the Civil War until the end of civilian Reconstruction some
five years later, Congress adopted a series of social welfare programs whose
benefits were expressly limited to blacks.”).
17. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1879).
18. See Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District
No. 1, supra note 8 (arguing that “integrated public schools serve as the fora
for educating young Americans to become tolerant citizens in a pluralistic
nation”).
19. See Morgan Whitaker, Justice Thomas Compares Affirmative Action
to Slavery, Segregation, MSNBC (June 24, 2013, 1:00 PM),
https://perma.cc/29C3-6ZAW (highlighting Justice Thomas’ comments
comparing affirmative action to slavery).
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manner ultimately leads to unwanted backlash and stigma.20
These concerns are not frivolous and should be considered by
policymakers but they have nothing to do with the
Constitution’s text and history or whether affirmative action
plans are constitutional.
Justice Roberts’ casual dismissal of the efforts by local
government officials to bring the races together relies on neither
text nor history. He does rely, erroneously, on the plaintiffs’ brief
in Brown v. Board of Education,21 for the proposition that “the
Fourteenth Amendment prevents states from according
differential treatment to American children on the basis of their
color or race.”22 But this out-of-context snippet, not from the
case, but from a brief, ignores all of the history and dynamics of
the Brown decision. As Justice Stevens remarked in dissent:
There is a cruel irony in The Chief Justice’s reliance on our
decision in Brown v. Board of Education. The first sentence
in the concluding paragraph of his opinion states: “Before
Brown, schoolchildren were told where they could and could
not go to school based on the color of their skin.” This
sentence reminds me of Anatole France’s observation: “[T]he
majestic equality of the la[w], . . . forbid[s] rich and poor
alike to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal
their bread.” The Chief Justice fails to note that it was only
black schoolchildren who were so ordered; indeed, the history
books do not tell stories of white children struggling to attend
black schools.23

There is not a syllable in Brown discussing the possibility
of local school districts trying on their own to address racial
segregation in public schools.24 The efforts by Louisville and
Seattle to do so by utilizing limited racial balancing, whether
good or bad, right, or wrong, do not violate any prior positive law
materials such as text, history, tradition, or precedent.

20. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 364–66 (2003) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (accepting the proposition that race-based jurisprudence can lead
to unintended stigma).
21. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
22. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 747 (2007).
23. Id. at 798–99 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
24. Brown, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Justice Roberts’ cliched sound bite that the way to end
racial discrimination is to stop discriminating on the basis of
race hides numerous difficult and contestable value judgments
underlying his personal distaste of voluntary efforts by state
governments to alleviate the burdens on our country caused by
centuries of slavery, segregation, and formalized racial
discrimination. How to address those problems raises difficult
questions for our country’s elected officials and school
administrators. But the idea that the Justices should interfere
and overrule those decisions when the beneficiaries are children
and schools, when the text and history of the Constitution are
silent on the issue, and when racial discrimination still haunts
our country, smacks much more of judicial hubris than
principled constitutional interpretation.25
B. Voting Rights
The Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County v. Holder,
striking down Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, is on many
scholar’s lists as one of the worst decisions in our country’s
history.26 In addition to its policy implications for voting rights,
the opinion written by Justice Roberts adopted an equal state
sovereignty principle which requires Congress to have a strong
reason to treat different states differently when it exercises its
power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment through, according
to the constitutional text, “appropriate legislation.”27 To justify
that anti-historical and non-textual equal state sovereignty
principle, Roberts relied on misleading dicta in a previous case
that he had written.28 That case, Northwest Austin v. Holder,
involved an earlier challenge to the Voting Rights Act that was

25. See Laura McKenna, How a New Supreme Court Ruling Could Affect
Special Education, ATLANTIC (Mar. 23, 2017), https://perma.cc/CXD9-9AFQ
(discussing impacts of Supreme Court decisions at the primary and secondary
school level).
26. See Paul Campos, This Supreme Court is a disgrace, SALON (June 26,
2013, 12:20 PM), https://perma.cc/4GYY-FE7A (discussing the flaws in the
Shelby County v. Holder opinion).
27. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 536 (2013).
28. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193
(2009) (stating in dicta that preclearance requirements under the Voting
Rights Act represent an intrusion into areas of state and local responsibility).
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decided on non-constitutional grounds.29 No case exemplifies the
Chief’s hubris more than Northwest Austin.
In Austin, Roberts said the following:
The [Voting Rights] Act also differentiates between the
States, despite our historic tradition that all the States enjoy
“equal sovereignty” . . . . Distinctions can be justified in some
cases. “The doctrine of the equality of States . . . does not
bar . . . remedies for local evils which have subsequently
appeared.” But a departure from the fundamental principle
of equal sovereignty requires a showing that a statute’s
disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently related to the
problem that it targets.30 (citations omitted).

As others have pointed out, before Roberts penned those
words, there never was any, much less a “fundamental
principle,” of equal state sovereignty limiting Congress’ powers
under the Reconstruction Amendments.31 As to the Fifteenth
Amendment specifically, the provision governing race
discrimination in voting, the Court in Katzenbach explicitly
rejected that fanciful notion in the same sentence Roberts cites
above, but with key words replaced by, to be generous, an
egregious ellipse.32
Here is the original passage from Katzenbach: “In
acceptable legislative fashion, Congress chose to limit its
attention to the geographic areas where immediate action
seemed necessary . . . . The doctrine of the equality of States,
invoked by South Carolina, does not bar this approach, for that
doctrine applies only to the terms upon which States are

29. See id. at 205 (noting that the Supreme Court will not decide a
constitutional question if there is another remedy).
30. Id. at 203 (emphasis added).
31. See, e.g., Joseph Fishkin, The Dignity of the South, 123 Yale L.J.
Online 175, 177 (2013) (explaining that while a “fundamental principle of
equal sovereignty of the states . . . has a nice ring to it,” it has no “basis in
either constitutional text or in existing constitutional doctrine”); Corey J.
Wasserburger, Note, If It’s Not Broken, then Why Fix It? The U.S. Supreme
Court Signals a Shift Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act in Northwest
Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504
(2009), 89 NEB. L. REV. 420, 429 (2010) (arguing that Chief Justice Robert’s
opinion struggled to find support for its proposition).
32. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 337 (1966) (holding
that the Fifteenth Amendment is a valid constitutional basis for the Voting
Rights Act of 1965).

ROBERTS: INSITUTIONALIST OR HUBRIS?

115

admitted to the Union, and not to the remedies for local evils
which have subsequently appeared.”33
The phrase “for that doctrine applies only to the terms upon
which States are admitted to the Union,” disappeared from
Roberts’ quotation.34 Nevertheless, in Shelby County, Chief
Justice Roberts used this alleged “fundamental principle” of
equal state sovereignty several times to argue that Section 5 of
the VRA was unconstitutional despite the undeniable facts that
no text in the Constitution supports such an idea, and the
unambiguous text of the Fifteenth Amendment says that
Congress may enforce it through “appropriate legislation.”35
Roberts simply cited his own opinion in Northwest Austin, which
misquoted and mischaracterized what Katzenbach said about
the issue. In fact, Katzenbach said the exact opposite about
equal state sovereignty in the part of the opinion that Roberts
omitted with ellipses in Austin.36
The idea that Congress cannot treat some states, especially
Southern ones, differently than others when it comes to racial
discrimination in voting (absent a strong reason) when Congress
acts under the authority given to it by the Reconstruction
Amendments, adopted in large part to change the racist
behavior of southern states, is absurd. Yet, by mere ipse dixit,
Roberts and the other conservative Justices employed this facile
idea to render mostly useless what many people think is the
most important statute ever enacted by the Congress—the
Voting Rights Act (the specific version of which was passed by a
unanimous Senate and signed by Republican President George
W. Bush).37
The real hubris here, however, is not the misreading of text,
history, and precedent for political purposes which both the
liberals and conservatives on the Court do on a relatively equal

33. Id. at 328–29 (emphasis added).
34. Compare Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 328–29, with Shelby Cty., 570 U.S.
at 544 (omitting the end of the original quote).
35. Shelby Cty., 570 U.S. at 530, 536.
36. Compare Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 328–29, with Northwest Austin, 557
U.S. at 203 (noting the issue with an omission of an ellipses).
37. See Case: Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. 1 v. Holder,
NAACP LEGAL DEF. FUND, https://perma.cc/4Z6S-Y5MU (noting the important
potential consequences of the Northwest Austin decision).
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basis.38 Rather, it is the overturning of a major constitutional
principle in a landmark case by omitting key words and
replacing them with ellipses. Did Roberts think no one would
notice? Justice Ginsburg pointed out all of this in dissent so he
knew what he was writing was demonstrably false.39 Openly
overturning Katzenbach on this point would have been bad
enough but doing it in this misleading manner, which he must
have known, smacks of hubris all the way down.
C. Campaign Finance Reform
The Chief Justice is proud of his First Amendment
decisions. He has said “I’m probably the most aggressive
defender of the First Amendment. Most people might think that
doesn’t quite fit with my jurisprudence in other
areas . . . . People need to know that we’re not doing politics.
We’re doing something different. We’re applying the law.”40
Despite the Chief’s statement, law has very little to do with most
of his free speech decisions but is especially absent from his
campaign finance opinions.
In the eyes of much of the public, liberal politicians, and law
professors, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission41 is
often considered the most offensive example of judicial
aggression by the Roberts Court. Although Justice Kennedy
wrote the majority opinion, Justice Roberts penned a
concurrence.42 If the Court had simply held that Citizens
United, a non-profit ideological organization, had the First
Amendment right to show its highly critical movie about Hillary
Clinton shortly before a national election, the decision would

38. See ERIC J. SEGALL, SUPREME MYTHS: WHY THE SUPREME COURT IS NOT
A COURT AND ITS JUSTICES ARE NOT JUDGES 5 (2012) (arguing that the Supreme

Court functions more like a veto council than a court of law).
39. See Shelby Cty., 570 U.S. at 559–94 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting)
(discussing the majority opinion’s mischaracterization of Katzenbach).
40. See John Roberts and Free Speech: A Report on the Roberts Court’s
First Amendment Jurisprudence, CATO INST. (Oct. 12, 2020),
https://perma.cc/BT3Q-W79C (analyzing Robert’s role in First Amendment
jurisprudence).
41. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n., 558 U.S. 310, 372
(2010) (holding corporate funding of independent political broadcasts cannot
be limited under the First Amendment).
42. See id.
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make sense. Instead, the Court used the occasion to announce
that corporations have the same free speech rights as people.43
This overbroad, anti-originalist holding is totally unwarranted
but the reality is that Citizens United, as a matter of pure
results, is not close to the worst and most unpersuasive
campaign finance case of the Roberts Court.
In McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, Chief
Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion for the other
conservatives in a five-to-four case invalidating limits on the
total amount of money a person may contribute to candidates or
political action committees.44 Roberts equated donating money
to candidates with speaking about politics and ruled that the
only even legitimate (much less compelling) governmental
interest that can justify campaign finance reform is stopping
direct quid pro quo corruption.45 That bizarre notion, which has
no foothold in the original meaning or text of the First
Amendment, led former Judge Richard Posner to write the
following:
Can so naive-seeming a conception of the political process
reflect the actual beliefs of the . . . chief justice? Maybe so,
but one is entitled to be skeptical. Obviously, wealthy
businessmen and large corporations often make substantial
political contributions in the hope (often fulfilled) that by
doing so they will be buying the support of politicians for
policies that yield financial benefits to the donors . . . . Isn’t
this obviously a form of corruption?46

McCutcheon is a classic case of judicial overreaching and
living constitutionalism. Congress placed limits on how much
money wealthy donors could contribute to political candidates
and unelected, life tenured judges decided that writing checks
to candidates and speaking on behalf of candidates are exactly
the same thing for constitutional law purposes. But they are not.
The checks facilitate speech, but they are not themselves speech.
43. See id.
44. See McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 572 U.S. 185, 227 (2014)
(holding that a two-year aggregate campaign contribution limit is
unconstitutional under the First Amendment).
45. Id.
46. Richard A. Posner, SCOTUS end of term: Is Roberts casual about the
truth in the campaign finance case McCutcheon?, SLATE (June 25, 2014, 1:06
PM), https://perma.cc/NXZ8-K2JS.
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Writing checks to plumbers, mechanics, and chefs is not speech.
Activity that leads to speech certainly can and should be
constitutionally protected, depending on the government’s
interest in regulating that activity. However, Posner’s point is
spot on when it comes to giving money to political candidates
which quite obviously raises the specter of undue influence and
at times corruption.47 Such interests might not be sufficient to
justify limits on speech itself but should be more than enough to
support reasonable limits on campaign spending. Whether such
laws are good or bad policy of course should not be the Court’s
concern, but reading McCutcheon makes clear Roberts’ utter
distaste of campaign finance reform laws.48 That distaste,
however, does not justify using the First Amendment as weapon
to implement the Chief’s policy preferences.
There are many First Amendment cases that reflect Justice
Roberts’ strong personal values, but one merits special
attention. After a major political scandal, Arizona’s voters
passed a state constitutional amendment approving public
financing of state campaigns.49 No candidate was required to
take the money (which, if they did so, meant forfeiting all other
contributions).50 If a candidate rejected the state’s money, and
her opponent accepted it, the state would kick in some extra
money to equalize the funding up to a modest limit.51
In Arizona Free Enterprise Fund v. Bennett,52 Roberts, in
yet another five-to-four decision, struck down this admirable
attempt by Arizona to lessen political corruption. Once again, no
originalist sources were cited. Moreover, no politician’s speech
was limited or restricted, and no candidate’s ability to fundraise
was hampered unless she voluntarily accepted the public funds.
As Justice Kagan said in dissent:
The First Amendment’s core purpose is to foster a healthy,
vibrant political system full of robust discussion and debate.
Nothing in Arizona’s anti-corruption statute, the Arizona

47. Id.
48. McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 191.
49. See Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S.
721, 728 (2011).
50. Id. at 728–30.
51. Id. at 729–30.
52. Id. at 754–55.
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Citizens Clean Elections Act, violates this constitutional
protection. To the contrary, the Act promotes the values
underlying . . . our entire Constitution by enhancing the
“opportunity for free political discussion to the end that
government may be responsive to the will of the people.”53

In all of these campaign finance cases, reasonable people
can disagree over whether the laws at issue constituted welcome
tools in the fight against political corruption or restrictions on
the facilitation of political speech that caused more harm than
good. But that balancing of values should be made by voters and
legislatures not unelected judges. None of the laws restricted
speech based on content or viewpoint, and all of them except
Citizens United did not even involve pure speech. 54
Chief Justice Roberts might think that his vendetta against
these laws is based, in his words, on “the law,”55 but his opinions
cite little text or history to support the rulings and are based
almost entirely on policy concerns. The line between good and
bad campaign finance reform may be hard to discern and is
fraught with subjectivity and personal preference but the line
between constitutional and unconstitutional laws designed to
combat political corruption should consider the desire of voters
and their elected officials to limit some of the corrosive effects of
money on political campaigns. It takes no ordinary share of
hubris for the Chief to substitute his policy preferences for those
of accountable governmental officials and voters on these
important election issues that so impact our nation’s state and
federal elections.
D. Church and State
In Everson v. Board of Education,56 decided in 1947, the
Supreme Court applied the First Amendment’s Establishment
Clause to the states for the first time.57 Although the Justices
upheld the public financing of busing school children to religious
schools, the Court also talked about the wall of separation
53. Id. at 757 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 734–35.
55. See John Roberts and Free Speech: A Report on the Roberts Court’s
First Amendment Jurisprudence, supra note 40 and accompanying text.
56. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
57. Id. at 16–18.
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between church and state.58 Justice Black said the following in
a memorable paragraph:
The “establishment of religion” clause of the First
Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a
person to go to or to remain away from church against his
will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.
No person can be punished for entertaining or professing
religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or
non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can
be levied to support any religious activities or institutions,
whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may
adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in
the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice
versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall
of separation between Church and State.’59

For the next fifty-three years, the Court spent considerable
time and energy deciding what aid the government may
constitutionally provide to religious schools.60 For some time,
the doctrine was completely incoherent with the Court allowing
the government to provide textbooks and bus transportation for
religious school students but virtually no other equipment or
materials could be publicly financed and neither could school
field trips.61 After the Court’s personnel changed, the Justices
held that virtually any secular aid provided to non-religious
private schools could also constitutionally be given to religious
schools if the government wanted to do so.62 At no time during
this fifty-three year period, did the Court even hint that school
districts had to provide the same aid to both religious and
non-religious schools under the Free Exercise Clause. Rather,
58. Id. at 15–16.
59. Id. at 15–16.
60. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 807–14 (discussing cases).
61. See Ethan Bronner, The Nation: Church, State and School; Squeezing
Through the Holes in the Wall of Separation, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 1998),
https://perma.cc/KQ3C-PV6T.
62. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 836.
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the issue was always whether the Establishment Clause
prevented aid that school districts or the government wanted to
provide.
Then came the Roberts Court. In Trinity Lutheran v.
Comer,63 the Court confronted a provision of the Missouri
Constitution prohibiting public money going to religious
institutions.64 Trinity Lutheran challenged this exclusion when
it was denied an opportunity to compete for state grants to
improve school playgrounds.65 The lower courts upheld the
constitutional provision which also exists in many other states.66
Although some of these state provisions were enacted due to
anti-Catholic bias in the nineteenth century, there was no
evidence in the record that Missouri made its decision because
of such bias.67 Rather, the state said it was trying to further
Establishment Clause values by categorically denying public
money to religious organizations.68
On the merits, the case was not easy. While most people
would agree that state aid cannot go directly to the religious
mission of private schools, and while most people believe that
generally available public services like police and fire protection
cannot be denied to religious groups simply because of their
religiosity, this case falls in the middle of those easy cases. The
Court ruled for the Church in an extremely narrow decision.69
Roberts’ hubris came through in two parts of the opinion.
The church did not seek actual damages but simply
prospective relief that its applications be treated equally in the
future with all other schools. A few months before the decision
was handed down, however, the newly elected Republican
Governor of Missouri announced that he was changing the
state’s policy.70 In the future, he said, religious groups will be

63. 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017).
64. Id. at 2017.
65. Id. at 2018.
66. Id. at 2018–19.
67. Id. at 2024.
68. Id. at 2023–24.
69. Id. at 2024.
70. Celeste Bott, Greitens Instructs DNR to Consider Religious
Organizations for Grants, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Apr. 13, 2017),
https://perma.cc/S5R5-6FGE.
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treated exactly the same as non-religious groups, which was the
very relief Trinity Lutheran asked for in its complaint.71
After the Governor made his announcement, the Court
asked the parties whether the case was now moot. Not
surprisingly, both Church and State, now on the same side of
the dispute, asked the Court to resolve the case because they
wanted a formal decision striking down the state’s
constitutional amendment.72 The legal basis for their request
that the Court rule on the merits was an exception to the
mootness doctrine that a defendant’s voluntary cessation of its
allegedly illegal conduct does not necessarily moot a case.73 The
Court accepted that argument in a footnote and held that the
“[d]epartment has not carried the ‘heavy burden’ of making
‘absolutely clear’ that it could not revert to its policy of excluding
religious organizations. The parties agree.”74 The Court only
cited one case for that proposition, but in that case, there was a
claim for money (not true in Trinity),75 and one of the parties in
that case wanted the Court to dismiss it (not true in Trinity).76
The Court should never have ruled on the merits in Trinity.
Reciting the magic words “voluntary cessation of [illegal
conduct] does not [necessarily] moot a case”77 did not give the
plaintiffs a personal injury that could be redressed by the Court
nor did it make the claims ripe for adjudication. The state said
it had no plans to resume the allegedly illegal behavior, and
there was no reason to doubt that promise.78 All the parties

71. See Lawrence Hurley, U.S. Top Court Urged to Decide Church Case
Despite State Policy Flip, REUTERS (Apr. 18, 2017, 1:20 PM),
https://perma.cc/FQF8-F2P9.
72. Compare Letter from David A. Cortman, Counsel for Petitioner, to the
Hon. Scott S. Harris, Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States (Apr.
18, 2017), https://perma.cc/8YZ9-TQMT, with Letter from D. John Sauer,
Missouri Attorney General’s Office, to the Hon. Scott S. Harris, Clerk of the
Supreme Court of the United States (Apr. 17, 2017), https://perma.cc/Z3HPT7ZY.
73. Compare Letter from David A. Cortman, supra note 72at 1–2, with
Letter from D. John Sauer, supra note 72, at 2.
74. See Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2019 n.1.
75. See Friends of the Earth Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs., Inc., 528 U.S.
167, 179 (2000).
76. Id. at 189.
77. Id. at 174.
78. See Letter from D. John Sauer, supra, note 73, at 1–2.
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agreed on every issue in the case, both on the merits and on the
jurisdictional question. If nothing else, Article III’s requirement
of a “case or controversy”79 at a minimum requires two adverse
parties arguing over something real. In this case we had two
aligned parties arguing over nothing. But Roberts and the other
Justices wanted to hear the case so they heard the case. In any
event, the jurisdictional issues were substantial enough that
Roberts, who wrote the opinion, should not have relegated them
to a particularly brief footnote.
The Court ruled for the church and held that religious
schools could not be categorically excluded from the grant
program.80 There is a lot to criticize in the opinion but that is
not my point. The hubris comes in yet another short footnote.
Perhaps to keep Justices Kagan and Breyer in the majority (the
other two liberals, Ginsburg and Sotomayor dissented), or for
other unrelated reasons, Justice Roberts said the following in
footnote three:
This case involves express discrimination based on religious
identity with respect to playground resurfacing. We do not
address religious uses of funding or other forms of
discrimination.81

This footnote is absurd. Roberts is essentially saying that
the case has no precedential value. How often will the issue of
playground resurfacing come up again in a church/state
dispute? As Justice Gorsuch remarked in his concurrence
criticizing that footnote, Supreme Court opinions are supposed
to be “governed by general principles, rather than ad hoc
improvisations.”82
The
limiting
footnote
confused
commentators,83 and no doubt would have confused lower courts
for years to come except that, as he often does, Justice Roberts
was simply playing the long game.

79. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl 1.
80. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2024–25.
81. Id. at 2024 n.3 (emphasis added).
82. Id. at 2026 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
83. See Alice O’Brien, Symposium: Playground Resurfacing Case
Provides Soft Landing for State “No Aid” Provisions, SCOTUSBLOG (June 28,
2017, 12:41 PM), https://perma.cc/RD62-BZWD.
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A few years after the Court decided Trinity came Espinoza
v. Montana Department of Revenue.84 This case had a
complicated procedural background, but the holding required
governments that assist secular private secular schools to
provide the same aid to private religious schools.85 Montana
argued that its exclusion of religious schools from its aid
program was to promote Establishment Clause concerns.86 The
Court had previously accepted a similar argument in a prior aid
case.87 Justice Roberts rejected the argument, however, and laid
down a ruling strongly favoring religious groups and casually
discarding the state’s interests in avoiding religious
establishments.88 He took his Trinity opinion and expanded it
well beyond playgrounds to all kinds of aid. As the dissent
recognized, the Court held:
[T]hat the Free Exercise Clause forbids a State to draw any
distinction between secular and religious uses of government
aid to private schools that is not required by the
Establishment Clause. The majority’s approach and its
conclusion in this case, I fear, risk the kind of entanglement
and conflict that the Religion Clauses are intended to
prevent.89

The point of these aid to religious schoolscases is not
necessarily to criticize Espinoza, though the decision is hard to
justify, but rather to show that, like with voting rights, the Chief
Justice had a long-term plan in mind and used narrow cases as
stepping-stones to slowly unravel and then reverse well-founded
and well-established constitutional doctrine. This long game
strategy requires planning, smarts, and a large amount of
judicial hubris.
In numerous major areas of constitutional law, Justice
Roberts, acting contrary to his sworn testimony and promises at
his confirmation hearing, did not act like an “umpire” enforcing

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020).
Id. at 2262.
Id. at 2260.
See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2003).
Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2257–60.
Id. at 2281 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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rules but rather a league commissioner changing the rules.90 His
opinions dramatically changed the constitutional doctrines of
freedom of speech, voting rights, equal protection, and the
relationship between church and state, among many other
areas. It would be one thing if Roberts conceded his role but, by
talking the talk of incrementalism and umpires, he has blithely
and obviously mischaracterized his role as a Supreme Court
Justice. That sleight of hand, hiding unabashed judicial
aggression against both state and federal laws, is not worthy of
the role of Chief Justice. Nevertheless, Roberts’ hubris has gone
largely unnoticed even if individual decisions sparked criticism.
The next section suggests why this so, and why that reason is so
dangerous.
II.

HUBRIS IGNORED

Legal scholars and commentators, as well as pundits and
politicians, rarely discuss the Justices as people. Court watchers
freely criticize opinions and doctrines (such as with the recent
spate of academic criticism of the Court’s “shadow docket”),91
and maybe occasionally the institution as a whole. But unlike
academic and other forms of criticism of presidents, governors,
senators, and a diverse array of elected officials, it is quite rare
that a pattern of misbehavior by a particular Justice is the
subject of public debate. For example, during his career, former
Chief Justice Rehnquist was addicted to painkillers for his
injured back impairing his performance,92 but at the time those
facts were not reported. Justice Alito spoke to religious groups
about his fear that “religious liberty” was in grave danger even
though he knew cases implicating that perceived threat were

90. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr.
to Be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts) (“Judges and
Justices are servants of the law, not the other way around. Judges are like
umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply them. The role of an umpire
and a judge is critical. They make sure everybody plays by the rules, but it is
a limited role.”).
91. See Steve Vladeck, “Shadow Dockets” Are Normal. The Way SCOTUS
Is Using Them Is the Problem., SLATE (Apr. 12, 2021, 6:09 PM),
https://perma.cc/3YC5-BFJ8.
92. See Jack Shafer, Rehnquist’s Drug Habit, SLATE (Sept. 9, 2005, 5:28
PM), https://perma.cc/28Z3-FGRW.
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headed to the Court.93 And Justice Kagan should have recused
herself from the first Obamacare decision94 because the Solicitor
Generals’ Office she headed litigated the case in the lower
courts. But she did not recuse, and only a few critics and
commentators noticed.95
The Supreme Court of the United States is one of, if not the
most, powerful judicial institutions in the world. Because we
don’t elect and can’t fire the Justices, it is imperative that the
institution be seen in a proper light and the Justices evaluated
fairly and accurately. As a society, we also tend to make the
Justices larger than life as they work in a huge marble palace
on a hill dispensing their wisdom in written opinions and rarely,
if ever, discussing their work. But the reality is that the Court
is a political institution made up of former lawyers who we fund
with our tax dollars and who are government officials. Criticism
(or praise when deserved) from Court experts is an imperative
component of our representative, constitutional democracy.
Unfortunately, we tend to only criticize legal results and
doctrines not the Justices themselves.
Chief Justice John Roberts is no umpire simply enforcing
pre-existing rules. He is also not a judge, as this essay has
shown, who takes prior law as he finds it. Instead, he is a master
tactician who uses long game techniques to install his personal
values into the law. Worse, he often does so through misleading
statements of prior law and well-planned sound bites that play
well on the news and in social media, but do not derive from
constitutional text, history, or precedent. That method of
deciding cases is a dangerous one and reflects judicial hubris
much more than a devotion to institutionalism.
CONCLUSION
The Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court has
a unique leadership role in our country’s judicial system.
Unfortunately, the present Chief often bends the rules and the
93. See Eric Segall, Judges Speaking Out: Justice Alito and Religious
Liberty, DORF ON LAW (May 20, 2017, 7:51 AM), https://perma.cc/6UNCMLW3.
94. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
95. See Eric J. Segall, Kagan and Recusal: The Story That Won’t Go Away,
NAT’L REV. (Dec. 18, 2011, 4:38 PM), https://perma.cc/564U-UZFK.
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law to achieve the outcomes he wants while maintaining that he
is just following the “law.” His opinions, unlike those of former
Justice Antonin Scalia, are written in a professional tone and
tend to sound in doctrinal language (except for his pithy sound
bites). But the reality is that, like all the Justices, the Chief is a
politician who works hard to further his personal values and
preferences. Those values are usually deeply conservative and
often out-of-step with prior law. Ingraining those values into
Supreme Court doctrine, no matter how much it distorts text,
history, and precedent, is the Chief’s main ambition. And that
is why hubris, not institutionalism, is the defining characteristic
of Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.

